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Note
An Emerging Trend in International Trade:
A Shift to Safeguard Against ISDS Abuses and
Protect Host-State Sovereignty
Nikesh Patel
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS “ISDS”?
Investor-state dispute settlement (“ISDS”) is a legal
mechanism contained in many international trade treaties that
grants an investor the right to use dispute settlement
proceedings to sue host governments in an international
tribunal.1 ISDS thus functions as an instrument of public
international law providing investors protection under a given
international trade treaty. With respect to ISDS, often the
difficulty in structuring an international trade treaty is finding
the right balance between providing investor protection and
protecting state sovereignty from abuses. As investors have
increasingly continued to initiate ISDS cases and sue host
governments under respective investment trade treaties,2
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1. See Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs & Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia Ctr. on
Sustainable Inv., Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Public Interest and U.S.
Domestic Law 1 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-StateDispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-198.pdf.
2. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN 2014 1 (2015), http://unctad.org/
en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d2_en.pdf (“Investors continue to use
the investor–State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism. In 2014, claimants
initiated 42 known treaty-based ISDS cases. The total number of known ISDS
cases reached 608.”).
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“investment dispute settlement is at the heart of this debate,
with a number of countries reassessing their positions.”3
Recently, Cecilia Malmström, the European Commissioner
for Trade, addressed the issue in question and stated Europe’s
renewed vision of international trade policy for the 21st century:
My assessment of the traditional ISDS system has been
clear—it is not fit for purpose in the 21st century . . . I
want to ensure fair treatment for EU investors abroad,
but not at the expense of governments’ right to regulate.
Our new approach ensures that a state can never be
forced to change legislation, only to pay fair
compensation in cases where the investor is deemed to
have been treated unfairly.4
Malmström’s recent statement concerning ISDS reform
reflects an emerging international consensus to improve the
regime of international investment agreements (“IIA”s) and the
ISDS mechanism as a better framework for sustainable
development.5 As countries increasingly continue to integrate
more with the global economy through international investment
agreements,6 the ISDS mechanism has been brought into the
public eye, offering an opportunity for countries to rethink policy
in trade agreements. Consequently, countries are shifting trade
policy in the 21st century towards safeguarding against ISDS
abuses and providing a more host-state friendly framework.
This Note seeks to address an emerging trend in
international investment policy towards safeguarding against
ISDS abuses and protecting host-state sovereignty. Part II
outlines the background of the ISDS mechanism in international
trade treaties and presents major arguments arising from its
application. Part III presents recent findings on ISDS disputes.

3. Id. at 23.
4. Cecilia Malmström, Investments in TTIP and Beyond - Towards an
International Investment Court, EUROPEAN COMM’N (May 5, 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/malmstrom/blog/investments-ttipand-beyond-towards-international-investment-court_en.
5. See generally UNCTAD Releases Review of Trends in Investment
Agreements and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE & DEV. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://unctad.org/en/pages/newsdetails.aspx
?OriginalVersionID=929&Sitemap_x0020_Taxonomy=UNCTAD+Home
(describing global trends in favor of the use of IIAs in the context of ISDS cases).
6. See id. (“In 2014, countries concluded one international investment
agreement every other week.”).
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Part IV analyzes recent trends in international trade policy from
various countries as a result of certain ISDS cases initiated by
investors. Finally, this Note concludes increased international
attention and ISDS disputes have resulted in an emerging shift
in trade policy where host-state governments are shifting to
safeguard against abuses and to protect government obligations.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF ISDS
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
International uniform law and ISDS share a common
goal7—”to reduce the importance of national borders in crossborder relationships by creating a fair, even, and predictable
playing field for private parties, regardless of their nationalities
and the loci of their activities.”8 More specifically, the Office of
the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) suggests for
governments to implement ISDS for at least three reasons: (1) to
resolve investment conflicts without creating state-to-state
conflict; (2) to protect citizens abroad; and (3) to signal to
potential investors that the rule of law will be respected.9
“Prior to the emergence of the ISDS system in the mid-20th
century, investor-state disputes” were handled through
diplomatic processes, “or, at times, by the threat or use of
military force.”10 Numerous elements of the current investment
protection system can be traced back to the Friendship,
Navigation and Commerce Treaties of the 19th and 20th
centuries.11 Countries like the United States, United Kingdom,
and Japan signed the treaties in the post-World War II era.12
7. Joshua Karton, Lessons from International Uniform Law, in
RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: JOURNEYS
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 48, 52 (Jean E. Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds., 2015).
8. Id.
9. FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 11, 2015), https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2015/march/investor-state-disputesettlement-isds.
10. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 7 (2012), http://www.oecd.org
/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291642.pdf.
11. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF
INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 22–23 (2009) [hereinafter
NEWCOMBE].
12. See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 310 (2013).
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The treaties were primarily signed to promote trade and
commercial relationships, however the investment protection
function of these treaties came to dominate. The treaties were
essentially designed to facilitate post-war reconstruction in
Europe thereby resulting in significant investment
protections.13 Before ISDS, an investor whose property was
treated inappropriately by a foreign government sought a
discriminatory action in the domestic courts of the foreign
government or support “of their claim by their investor’s home
government through a state-to-state dispute settlement.”14 With
that in mind, ISDS intended to reflect a more cooperative and
peaceful “mechanism for [effectively] addressing disputes
between investors and host countries” without having to subject
states to conflicts.15
In 1959, elements and provisions of modern investment
protection law were introduced, where “ISDS first appeared in a
bilateral trade agreement between Germany and Pakistan.”16
“The intention was to encourage foreign investment by
protecting investors from discrimination or expropriation.”17
Nevertheless, “it was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s
that a specific type of dispute settlement was introduced in
investment treaties,” including the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Energy Charter Treaty.18 Instead of a stateto-state dispute, the dispute settlement proceedings now allow a
foreign company as an investor to directly file suit “against the
host state and seek arbitration between the investor and the
state” government.19 Accordingly, the newly established system
of investor-state dispute settlement shifted investment

13. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 11, at 23.
14. MARTIN A. WEISS, SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, BRANDON J. MURRILL &
DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44015, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (IIAS): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 13 (2015).
15. Id.
16. See The Arbitration Game, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration.
17. Id.
18. See NIKOLAOS I. THEODORAKIS, TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: LAW, PRACTICE, AND EMERGING TOOLS AGAINST
INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 23 (2015).
19. See MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, MODALITIES FOR INVESTMENT PROTECTION
AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS) IN TTIP FROM A TRADE
UNION PERSPECTIVE 6 (2014).
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agreements from “mere tools of commercial diplomacy into
legally enforceable instruments.”20
An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism was an
“institutional innovation inasmuch as it helped to reduce sources
of international tension and recourse to military force.”21 The
goal was to “promote compliance with international law, help to
settle international disputes, and provide redress for victims of
harm caused by violations of various aspects of international
law.”22 ISDS thereby provides “both an enforcement mechanism
that promotes compliance and a means of compensating victims
of harm caused by breaches of investment treaty provisions.”23
As a result of its continued application, “states give their consent
to participate in ISDS [proceedings] in some 3,000 international
investment treaties.”24
B. ARGUMENTS ARISING FROM ISDS
Numerous arguments surround the issue of ISDS as a
mechanism incorporated in international investment treaties.
Both supporters and opponents frame their arguments based
upon disciplines and rationale arising from political science,
economics, and the law.
Proponents often argue that Foreign Direct Investment
(“FDI”) encourages more foreign investment and such
investments benefit an economy with more jobs and
development, thereby increasing economic growth.25 An open
international investment environment creates jobs and wealth
worldwide and improves infrastructure in participating
countries ranging from developed, developing and emerging
economies.26 ISDS is “a fair, efficient investment protection
system” that protects investors from non-discriminatory
treatment by host-state countries.27 ISDS provides a “swift and
20. Id.
21. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 10, at 7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 63.
25. See BUS. AND INDUS. ADVISORY COMM. TO THE OECD, INVESTOR-STATE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF INVESTMENT
PROTECTION 2 (2015), http://biac.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/BIACInvestor-State-Dispute-Settlement.pdf.
26. Id. at 2.
27. See id. at 1.
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high-quality mechanism of legal dispute resolution in cases of
breaches of investment treaties by host states.”28 Therefore, the
resolution system creates a non-discriminatory legal framework
that is instrumental for enterprise, investment, and growth.
Furthermore, without ISDS, the enforceability of
contractual obligations between investors and the government
would be undermined.29 As a result of regulatory risk, investors
are less incentivized to make “beneficial investments . . . to the
socially optimal amount.”30 A holdup problem is therefore
created where domestic regulations and policies can be
arbitrarily imposed on investors thereby increasing the costs for
investors and making investors less likely to further invest.31 In
effect, some argue that ISDS mitigates the holdup problem by
indemnifying investors if a host government’s policies “are
causing ‘unjustified’ harm through an ex post erosion of
investment incentives.”32 The mechanism provides further
assurance against discriminatory treatment because it follows
procedures separate from the government’s legal system.
Aside from the economic rationale, some also argue that
ISDS protects against political risk. As suggested by Terra
Lawson-Remer, an economist at the Brookings Institution, ISDS
clauses protect investors against egregious governmental abuse
by purchasing political-risk insurance.33 Investors can seek
remedies through a uniform, agreed-upon arbitration system
that is non-discriminatory, timely, and outside the political
control of the host-state government. ISDS arbitration can thus
provide a framework for international law to mitigate potential
political risk and protect against a host-state’s changing political
climate.34 ISDS also upholds the rule of law pursuant to the
investment treaty and shields investors from domestic courts,

28. Id.
29. See Peter H. Chase, TTIP, Investor–State Dispute Settlement and the
Rule of Law, 14 EUR. VIEW 217, 221 (2015).
30. WILHELM KOHLER & FRANK STÄHLER, THE ECONOMICS OF INVESTOR
PROTECTION: ISDS VERSUS NATIONAL TREATMENT 1 (2016), http://www.cesifogroup.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WPCESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2016/wp-cesifo-201602/cesifo1_wp5766.pdf.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 2.
33. See The Arbitration Game, supra note 16.
34. See Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Paradigm, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 725–47 (2007).
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potential expropriation, and damaging public policies.35 As a
result, supporters contend that the ISDS framework encourages
FDI for economic growth and development and ensures investor
protection from political risk.
In contrast, opponents have arguments grounded upon
public versus private rights and protection of national
sovereignty against corporate interests. First, on the grounds of
public versus private rights, it is argued that ISDS has
“completely circumvent[ed] the very balance between private
and public rights that has developed in the domestic context, and
undermines the institutions that continue to shape it.”36 In other
words, private arbitration courts are not the preferred
institution to solve investor-state disputes. Rather, it is urged
that domestic courts ought to be the appropriate institution
because such courts prevent total insulation of host governments
from regulating for the public interest and are more likely to
consider the environmental, security, safety, and social interests
than ISDS tribunals.37 Accordingly, Economist Joseph Stiglitz,
Professor Judith Resnik, Professor Cruz Reynoso, and former
Federal Judge Lee Sarokin shared these concerns in their letter
to Congress opposing ISDS.38 The letter noted that ISDS risks
undermining democratic norms because domestic laws and
regulations enacted by elected officials are insulated from input
in a private arbitration process.39 The authors further noted that
domestic law follows precedent and is a “uniform application of
the law regardless of which judge or court hears a case” whereas
ISDS arbitration panel decisions cannot be appealed and are not
required to follow precedent.40
Furthermore, arguments against ISDS are also grounded
upon the protection of national sovereignty over corporate
35. See id.
36. JOHNSON, SACHS & SACHS, supra note 1, at 5.
37. Id.
38. See generally Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor, Yale Law Sch., Cruz
Reynoso, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Honorable H. Lee Sarokin, Former U.S.
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court Appeals, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Colum. Univ.,
& Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., to Mitch McConnell, Senate
Majority Leader, Harry Reid, Senate Minority Leader, John Boehner, Speaker
of the House, & Nancy Pelosi, House Minority Leader (Apr. 30, 2015) (“ISDS
weakens the rule of law by removing the procedural protections of the legal
system and using a system of adjudication with limited accountability and
review. It is antithetical to the fair, public, and effective legal system that all
Americans expect and deserve.”).
39. See id.
40. Id.
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interests.41 In other words, allowing corporations to circumvent
domestic courts and sue host-state governments to seek relief
from taxpayers in ISDS tribunals compromise government
sovereignty. An investor’s suit against a host government’s
public welfare policy concerning the environment or public
health thus interferes with a government’s regulatory
autonomy. With that in mind, critics have suggested that ISDS
allows investors to challenge public interest regulation thereby
creating substantial risk of undermining State sovereignty.42
In summary, arguments regarding ISDS have become
increasingly politicized where competing interests of thought
and different actors contribute to shape its institutional design
and role. On a horizontal dimension, interest groups have
debated the benefits and costs of arbitration, whereas on a
vertical dimension governments encounter a challenge to
balance national sovereignty against global or investor
interests.43
III.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Investor-state disputes have increased dramatically over
the past two decades. The growth in international investment
agreements has brought a major expansion in the filing of
claims.44 In an Issue Note published on July 15, 2015, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)
found that in 2014 claimants initiated 42 known treaty-based
ISDS cases.45 The total number of known ISDS cases reached
608.”46 The following graph illustrates the overall known ISDS
claims from 1987 to 2014 and includes arbitration proceedings

41. See Alex Weaver, Between ICSID and a Hard Place, 22 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://cjel.law.columbia.edu/preliminary-reference/2015
/between-icsid-and-a-hard-place/ (“The opposition to ISDS is grounded in a
legitimate concern over sovereignty and regulatory latitude.”).
42. See Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That
Lets Corporations Sue Countries, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2015), http://www.the
guardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportationssue-states-ttip-icsid.
43. See Thomas Dietz & Marius Dotzauer, Political Dimensions of
Investment Arbitration: ISDS and the TTIP Negotiations 19–20 (ZenTra Ctr. for
Transnational Studies, Working Paper No. 48/2015).
44. Karton, supra note 7, at 1–2.
45. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 2, at 1.
46. Id.
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arising from International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”) and non-ICSID disputes.

Figure 1. The overall number of known ISDS claims is 608.
Ninety-nine governments around the world have been
respondents to one or more known ISDS claims.47

47. Id. at 2.
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In the recent Issue Note, the UNCTAD also presented the
types of claims that were subject to dispute proceedings. Some
include claims arising from legislative reforms in the renewable
energy sector, alleged discrimination of foreign investors,
alleged direct expropriations of investments, and cases
concerning public policies, including environmental issues, antimoney laundering, and taxation.48 Furthermore, for the reported
cases, the amount claimed ranges from $8 million to about $2.5
billion.49
On June 25, 2015, the UNCTAD, published the 2015 World
Investment Report.50 For each year, the Report covers the latest
trends in foreign direct investment and analyzes in-depth one
selected topic related to foreign direct investment and
development.51 The 2015 Report “aims to inform global debates
on the future of the international policy environment for crossborder investment.”52 In particular, it addresses the key
challenges in international investment protection and
promotion, including the right to regulate, investor-state dispute
settlement, and investor responsibility.53 In Chapter 4, the
Report addresses an action for IIA reform. It notes that, as a
result of the increase in ISDS cases during the last fifteen years,
broad IIA provisions have allowed investors to challenge core
domestic policy decisions in the areas of environmental, energy,
and health policies.54 Unlike the past, “there are more and more
developed countries as defendants.”55 Consequently, it has
triggered global debate about the pros and cons and whether or
not to have ISDS. In response to these recent developments, “a
number of countries have been reassessing their positions on
ISDS and have already adopted certain reform measures.”56
According to the Report, two broad alternatives have come to

48. See id. at 4.
49. Id.
50. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., World Investment Report 2015:
Reforming International Investment Governance, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD
/WIR/2015 (June 25, 2015).
51. See generally World Investment Reports, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE
AND DEV., http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report
/WIR-Series.aspx (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (providing digital access to the
World Investment Report, published annually since 1991).
52. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 50, at iii.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 125.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 145.
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exist: to keep and reform ISDS, as some countries have done, or
to abandon and/or replace ISDS. As the Report suggests, given
the recent criticism of the existing system, “maintaining the
status quo is hardly an option.”57
IV.

ANALYSIS

With the recent growth in ISDS cases, countries have
modified their approach in general trade policy and
international investment treaties.58 In response to adverse
outcomes in ISDS cases initiated by investors, an emerging
trend in international trade policy from various countries has
resulted in a shift towards safeguarding against ISDS abuses
and further protecting host-state sovereignty.59 As a result of
increased international attention on ISDS abuses, countries are
thereby engaging in a more comprehensive approach toward
protecting host state-sovereignty.60 Recent IIAs, bilateral
investment treaties (“BIT”s), and ongoing trade negotiations
among specific countries will thus illustrate an increased role in
international investment law to protect a host state’s autonomy
and mitigate potential ISDS abuses.
A. INDIA: WHITE INDUSTRIES AUSTRALIA LIMITED V.
REPUBLIC OF INDIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA’S
NEW MODEL BIT
Recently, the Government of India approved a new Model
BIT that will provide the terms and conditions for India’s future
trade negotiations, including the renegotiations of some of its 83
existing BITs and ongoing negotiations with the United States.61
In general, the goal for structuring a BIT for a host state is to
find an appropriate balance between two competing interests:
providing investor protection and preserving a host state’s
regulatory autonomy. India’s new Model BIT differs from the
previous 2003 Model BIT, where the 2003 Model BIT functions
57. Id.
58. See Karton, supra note 7, at 1–2.
59. See FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), supra
note 9.
60. See id.
61. See India Approves Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, CMS LAW-NOW
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/01/india-approvesmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty.
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as being more “investor-friendly.” Since 2010, notices and claims
from various foreign investors under different BITs have
increased, and as a result, it has influenced a shift towards more
regulatory freedom.62 Subsequently, the new Model BIT shifts to
being more “host-state friendly” by providing greater regulatory
freedom and government protections.
After 2010, India experienced a surge in its involvement
with International Trade Administration (“ITA”) claims.63 In
particular, a case in 2011 greatly influenced India’s
reassessment on how to approach future bilateral investment
treaties. In White Industries Australia Limited v. Republic of
India, a tribunal found that India violated its obligations to the
investor under the India-Australia BIT.64 The ruling was the
first investment treaty decision adverse to India.65 White
Industries, an Australian company, had been in contract to
supply and develop equipment for Coal India.66 A dispute then
arose between both parties and it was then submitted to the
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”).67 Nine years after
the ICC awarded in favor of White Industries, the company was
still waiting for domestic Indian Courts to decide upon its
jurisdictional claims.68 White Industries then filed a claim
against India under the Australia-India BIT and claimed that
India violated its obligations because it had “treated White’s
investment on a less favorable basis than treatment afforded to
investments of investors of a third country.”69 Similar to the
2003 Model BIT, the Australia-India BIT contains a broad
definition of what constituted “investment” by a foreign
investor.70 The Australia-India BIT does not contain language
62. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, REPORT NO. 260: ANALYSIS OF THE 2015
DRAFT MODEL INDIAN BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY ¶ 1.6–7 (2015).
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. India Approves Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, CMS LAW-NOW
(Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.cms-lawnow.com/ealerts/2016/01/india-approvesmodel-bilateral-investment-treaty.
66. White Indus. Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, Final Award, ¶ 3.2.2, (ITA
Inv. Treaty Cases 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0906.pdf.
67. Id. ¶ 3.2.24–29.
68. Id. ¶ 4.3.5.
69. Id. ¶ 4.4.1.
70. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 1,
India-Austl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf; see also
India Model Text of BIPA, ITALAW art. 1, http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf.
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requiring an investor to have actual presence, nor a requirement
of having business activities in the host state.71 The following
text is what constitutes an “investment” under the AustraliaIndia BIT.
(c) “investment” means every kind of asset, including
intellectual property rights, invested by an investor of
one Contracting Party in the territory of the other
Contracting Party in accordance with the laws and
investment policies of that Contracting Party . . . .
(d) “investor” means:
(i) in respect of India, a company or a national. A
national is a person deriving status as an Indian
national from the laws in force in India;
(ii) in respect of Australia, a company or a natural
person who is a citizen or permanent resident of
Australia. A permanent resident is a natural whose
residence in Australia is not limited as to time under
its laws:72
In addition, the Australia-India BIT contains a most favored
nation (“MFN”) clause.73 A MFN clause allows an investor to
import more beneficial standards of protection from other
treaties. Subsequently, White Industries argued that the MFN
clause allowed the company to import a more advantageous
provision from the India-Kuwait BIT, which requires the host
state to “provide effective means of asserting claims and
enforcing rights.”74 The tribunal accepted the argument and
awarded the company $4.08 million plus interest and fees.75

71. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, supra
note 70; India Model Text of BIPA, supra note 70.
72. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 1,
India-Austl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf.
73. Id. art. 16 (“[W]hether general or specific, entitling investments by
investors of the other Contracting Party to treatment more favorable than is
provided for by the present agreement, such rules shall to the extent that they
are more favorable prevail over the present Agreement.”).
74. Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, India-Kuwait, art. 4, Nov. 27, 2001, http://finmin.nic.in
/bipa/Kuwait.pdf.
75. White Indus, Austl. Ltd. v. Republic of India, supra note 66, ¶ 3.2.33.

286

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:1

Thus, the tribunal found that delays by India Courts amounted
to a breach of the “effective means” standard under the IndiaKuwait BIT.76
As a result of the decision in White Industries Australia
Limited, India undertook a review of its 2003 Model BIT and
made a new draft of a Model BIT.77 The new Model BIT shifts
toward a more host-state friendly framework. The Law
Commission of India’s Report on the first Model BIT draft states
that “[t]he Report is presented with a view to assist the
Government in achieving a balanced negotiating text, that takes
into consideration the protection of Indian investors investing
abroad, as well as safeguarding the regulatory powers of the
State.”78
Consequently, the new Model BIT eliminates the previous
broad definition of what constitutes an “investment” and does
not mention the application of an MFN clause.79 The new Model
BIT adopts an “enterprise-based” approach to the definition of
investment.80 The following text reflects what constitutes an
“investment” under the new Model BIT released in January
2016.
”[I]nvestment” means an enterprise constituted,
organised and operated in good faith by an investor in
accordance with the law of the Party in whose territory
the investment is made, taken together with the assets
of the enterprise, has the characteristics of an
investment such as the commitment of capital or other
resources, certain duration, the expectation of gain or
profit, the assumption of risk and a significance for the
development of the Party in whose territory the

76. India Liable under BIT for Extensive Judicial Delays, THOMSON
REUTERS, Feb. 29, 2012, at 2–3 (“[T]he court delays did not reach the high
standard required to constitute a denial of justice, but they did breach the less
demanding ‘effective means’ standard in the India-Kuwait BIT.”).
77. See LAW COMM’N OF INDIA, supra note 62, ¶ 1.7 (“As a result of the
adverse White Industries award and the ITA notices under different BITs, there
is renewed focus on India’s BIT programme.”).
78. Id. ¶ 1.12.
79. See Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, MINISTRY
FIN.,
http://finmin.nic.in/the_ministry/dept_eco_affairs/investment_division
/ModelBIT_Annex.pdf.
80. See id. art. 1.
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investment is made. An enterprise may possess the
following assets . . . .
“enterprise” means:
(i) any legal entity constituted, organised and
operated in compliance with the law of a Party,
including any company, corporation, limited liability
partnership or a joint venture; and
(ii) a branch of any such entity established in the
territory of a Party in accordance with its law and
carrying out business activities there.
“[I]nvestor” means a natural or juridical person of a
Party, other than a branch or representative office, that
has made an investment in the territory of the other
Party;
For the purposes of this definition, a “juridical person”
means:
(a) a legal entity that is constituted, organised and
operated under the law of that Party and that has
substantial business activities in the territory of that
Party; or
(b) a legal entity that is constituted, organised and
operated under the laws of that Party and that is
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a natural
person of that Party or by a legal entity mentioned
under subclause (a) herein.81
As a result, the new Model BIT defines an investment as “an
enterprise constituted, organised and operated in good faith by
an investor in accordance with the law of the Party in whose
territory the investment is made . . . .”82 Enterprise includes “a
branch of any such entity established in the territory of a Party
in accordance with its law and carrying out business activities
there.”83 In contrast, the Australia-India BIT described an
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. art. 1.
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investment to include “every kind of asset.”84 Therefore, the
definition of “investment” is more narrowly tailored than the
Australia-India BIT, which is similar in language to India’s 2003
Model BIT. Furthermore, the new Model BIT requires investors
to exhaust local remedies at least 5 years before commencing a
“notice of dispute” under an international tribunal.85 Also, the
new Model BIT does not contain a MFN provision.86 In effect,
unlike White Industries Australia Limited, the new Model BIT
would prohibit treaty shopping and disallow investors to import
beneficial provisions in other India BITs.
The adverse outcome in White Industries Australia Limited
and the recent increase in pending claims from investors have
shifted India’s new Model BIT from a prior “investor-friendly” to
a “host-state friendly” framework. Although India’s new Model
BIT ensures investor protection, it tips the scale more toward
protecting its sovereignty. As India emerges in the global
marketplace towards a more open economy, the country’s new
model BIT illustrates greater protections for governance. While
India continues to integrate with the global economy and
negotiate prospective investment trade treaties, the new Model
BIT provides India with more autonomy and safeguards against
prospective ISDS claims like in White Industries Australia Ltd.
B. CANADA: LONE PINE RESOURCES INC. V. THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON
CETA
In August 2014, Canada and the European Union concluded
negotiations on the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (“CETA”).87 In Canada and the European
Union, ISDS measures and recent cases have raised public
scrutiny and doubts concerning FTAs.88 Questions in Germany
84. See Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, IndiaAustl., Feb. 26, 1999, http://finmin.nic.in/bipa/Australia.pdf.
85. Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, supra note 79,
art. 15.
86. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87. See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), EUROPEAN
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ (last updated Aug. 3,
2016).
88. See Les Whittington, Investor Protection Fears Could Unravel CanadaEU Trade Deal, TORONTO STAR (Jul. 26, 2014), http://www.thestar.com
/news/canada/2014/07/26/investor_protection_fears_could_unravel_canadaeu_t
rade_deal.html.
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about the value of ISDS measures were heightened by a case
involving a Swedish power company, Vattenfall, filing suit
against Germany for $5.8 billion plus interest after Germany
began to phase out nuclear energy.89 The final decision was not
available to the public.90 Similarly, a case also raised doubt in
Canada where an energy company, Lone Pine Resources Inc.,
initially filed a $250 million suit against Canada under
provisions of NAFTA after Quebec implemented a ban on
fracking.91 The case remains active. Subsequently, Canada and
the European Union began to increase their attention to
reassess ISDS as prospective trade negotiations between both
countries continued. The consolidated text of the agreement
reflects this commitment.92 In the preamble, the agreement
states that “the provisions of this Agreement preserve the right
of the Parties to regulate within their territories and the Parties’
flexibility to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as public
health, safety, environment, public morals and the promotion
and protection of cultural diversity.”93 As a result of increased
public criticism and the Lone Pine Resources’ case, the final
CETA negotiations signal an indication that Canada and the
EU, have begun to consider reforming ISDS and to further
protect state sovereignty.
In Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada,
Lone Pine Resources alleges that the company has contractual
interests relating to five exploration licenses for petroleum,
89. See generally NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER & MARTIN
DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY IN
VATTENFALL V. GERMANY II: LEAVING THE GERMAN PUBLIC IN THE DARK 2 (Dec.
2014),
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-playvattenfall-vs-germany-II-leaving-german-public-dark-en.pdf (“According to
most recent media reports, Vattenfall is claiming compensation of
€4,675,903,975.32 (US$5.8 billion) plus 4 per cent interest. . . . [T]he German
government spent over €3.2 million on attorneys’ fees, experts’ fees and services
such as translations; that amount also includes €200,000 spent on arbitration
costs. Machnig also stated that the German government estimates that the total
costs of the proceedings could reach €9 million.”).
90. See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/12/12, Decision, (ITA Inv. Treaty Cases 2013), http://www.italaw.com
/cases/1654#sthash.gUAhqAcV.dpuf.
91. Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada, Notice of
Arbitration, ¶¶ 53–58 (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw1596.pdf.
92. See Consolidated CETA Text, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last visited Oct. 1,
2016).
93. Id. at 3.
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natural gas, and underground reservoirs.94 The licenses were
signed with the holder, Junex Inc., a Canadian company.95 In
2011, a Quebec law, An Act to limit oil and gas activities (the
“Act”), was enacted to revoke exploration licenses located in the
St. Lawrence River, and consequently, the Act revoked one of
Lone Pine Resources’ exploration licenses.96 Lone Pine claimed
that the revocation of the license violated Canada’s obligations
under Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”).97 Article 1105 of NAFTA provides that
“each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another
Party treatment in accordance with international law, including
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”98
In addition, Lone Pine claimed the revocation of the license
violated Canada’s obligations under Article 1110 of NAFTA.99
Article 1110 states: “No Party may directly or indirectly
nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment, except:
for a public purpose; on a non-discriminatory basis; in
accordance with due process of law, and on payment of
compensation.”100 Lone Pine therefore asserts that the Act
breaches NAFTA in two ways: (1) that the revocation constituted
an uncompensated “expropriation” that lacks a public purpose
in violation of Article 110; and (2) the Act violates Canada’s
obligation to afford the “minimum standard” guaranteed by
Article 1105 to Lone Pine’s investments.
In response, the Government of Canada alleged that the Act
does not affect the claimant because it is not the holder of the
exploration license owned by Junex.101 The Government notes
94. See Cases Filed Against the Government of Canada: Lone Pine
Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL AFF. CAN.,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/disp-diff/lone.aspx?lang=eng (last modified Mar. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter GLOBAL AFF. CAN.].
95. Id.
96. See Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, Claimant’s
Memorial, ¶ 6 (ITA Inv. Treaty Cases 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites
/default/files/case-documents/italaw4259.pdf
[hereinafter
Lone
Pine
Resources].
97. See id. ¶ 280.
98. See id.; see also North American Free Trade AgreementCan-Mex.-U.S.,
art. 1105, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
99. Lone Pine Resources, supra note 96, ¶ 7.
100. Id.
101. See GLOBAL AFF. CAN., supra note 94.
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that the Act is a legitimate measure of public interest that
applies indiscriminately to all holders of exploration licenses,
and achieves an important public policy objective—the
protection of the St. Lawrence River.102 The Act therefore cannot
be considered an “arbitrary, unfair or inequitable measure.”103
Lastly, the Government of Canada disputes the investment was
capable of being expropriated, and even if so, the Act was not
“tantamount” to expropriation or substantially depriving the
investor because only one of the five licenses was revoked.104
Ultimately, the Government suggests that the Act is a
“legitimate exercise of the Government of Quebec’s police power
and, thus, the measure cannot constitute an expropriation.”105
The status of the case remains active. As Canadian taxpayers
remain subject to liability for millions of dollars, the case has
long raised public scrutiny in Canada.106 Consequently, an
adverse decision holding Canada in violation of the agreement
could further ignite public tensions on the country’s trade
policies moving forward.
Furthermore, Canada is the most sued country under
NAFTA and a majority of the disputes involve investors
challenging the country’s environmental laws.107 As a result of
numerous ISDS claims against Canada, including Lone Pine
Resources Inc., a growing backlash has resulted in Canada and
globally against ISDS claims challenging public policy and
regulatory measures.108 With that in mind, the prospective trade
agreement between Canada and the European Commission
(“CETA”) can provide an indication on whether Canada has

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See generally Julian Beltrame, Quebec Fracking Ban Lawsuit Shows
Perils Of Free Trade Deals: Critics, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/10/03/quebec-fracking-banlawsuit_n_4038173.html (warning that Canada needs to be careful in
negotiating trade pacts around the world).
107. Sunny Freeman, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued
Country Under Free Trade Tribunals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/14/canada-sued-investor-state-disputeccpa_n_6471460.html.
108. See Scott Sinclair, Investor vs. State: Canada is Being Pummeled by
NAFTA Corporate Lawsuits. Why Do We Put Up with It?, CANADIAN CTR. FOR
POL’Y ALTERNATIVES (July 1, 2015), https://www.policyalternatives.ca
/publications/monitor/investor-vs-state.
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altered its terms on ISDS and shifted more towards protecting a
host state’s regulatory freedom.
On September 26, 2014, the Canada-EU summit marked the
end of the negotiations of CETA.109 The trade-negotiating
mandate became available to the public in December 2015.110
The Preamble of CETA recognizes that the provisions preserve
the right to regulate and preserve a host state’s flexibility to
achieve legitimate policy objectives.111 In addition, the preamble
also ensures recognition of the “importance of international
security, democracy, human rights and the rule of law for the
development
of
international
trade
and
economic
cooperation.”112 Therefore, while CETA ensures investor
protection, the general purpose of CETA also highlights the
significance of protecting state sovereignty. Under NAFTA, as
noted in Lone Pine Resources Inc., the agreement contains a
broad public interest exception under what constitutes an
expropriation. However, under CETA, the language goes further
to address a host state’s right to regulate:
For greater certainty, except in the rare circumstance
where the impact of the measure or series of measures is
so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly
excessive, non-discriminatory measures of a Party that
are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the
environment,
do
not
constitute
indirect
expropriations.113
The language differs from NAFTA’s expropriation clause
and further expands protection for a host state’s regulatory
autonomy. As illustrated in the text, CETA thus provides “a
presumption that there is no indirect expropriation where a new
regulation in the field of health, safety and environment makes
it substantially more costly for companies to deploy their
activities in the host State concerned.”114
109. See Canada, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy
/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/ (last modified Sept. 13, 2016).
110. See id.
111. Consolidated CETA Text, supra note 92.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 183.
114. EU Law Alert: Increased Protection of Foreign Investments Under the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Recently Signed Between the
European Union and Canada, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP (Oct.
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In addition, the ISDS provisions in CETA stipulate new
rules on the conduct of procedures in ISDS proceedings.
Specifically, these include “complete transparency—all
documents submitted will be publicly available, all hearings will
be open to the public and all interested parties will be able to
make submissions.”115 The improved transparency is intended to
replace previous BIT agreements between Canada and the
European Commission, which had given rise to serious concerns
as to “both transparency and abusive or excessive restrictions on
public authorities in their relations with foreign investors.”116 As
a result of much criticism of the confidential arbitral
proceedings, Article 8.36 of the consolidated text ensures
transparency of proceedings by adopting the UNCITRAL Rules
on Transparency to all ISDS proceedings.117
With initiatives also pushed by the European Commission,
the recent conclusions of negotiations under CETA illustrate
Canada’s commitment to reform ISDS and further protect hoststate regulatory autonomy.118 The rise of public dissatisfaction
may not completely reflect the changes made in ISDS under
CETA. Nevertheless, it does provide a greater emphasis than
previous IIAs on ensuring host state sovereignty.
C. AUSTRALIA: PHILIP MORRIS ASIA LIMITED V. THE
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND RESULTING
CHANGES UNDER CHAFTA
On June 17, 2015, China and Australia signed the ChinaAustralia Free Trade Agreement (“ChAFTA”), which was
implemented on December 20, 2015.119 Prior to the enactment,
27, 2014), http://www.kramerlevin.com/EU-Law-Alert-Increased-Protection-ofForeign-Investments-Under-the-Comprehensive-Economic-and-TradeAgreement-Recently-Signed-Between-the-European-Union-and-Canada-10-272014/.
115. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, CETA – SUMMARY OF THE FINAL NEGOTIATING
RESULTS 11 (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/
tradoc_152982.pdf; see generally UNCITRAL, RULES ON TRANSPARENCY IN
TREATY-BASED INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (Jan. 2014), https://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-onTransparency-E.pdf (explaining rule on transparency).
116. EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 115, at 12.
117. See Consolidated CETA Text, supra note 92, at 66.
118. See Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement
(CETA), EUROPEAN COMM’N (Feb. 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs
/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf.
119. See China-Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA), AUSTRALIAN
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in 2011, tobacco company Phillip Morris filed suit against
Australia alleging the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (the
“Tobacco Act”) prohibited the company from using its
intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging.120 The
Tobacco Act regulates the retail packaging and appearance of
tobacco products.121 Its stated objectives include, “the
improvement of public health by discouraging people from
taking up smoking, encouraging people to give up smoking,
discouraging people from relapsing if they have given it up, and
reducing people’s exposure to smoke from tobacco products to
improve public health by discouraging people from smoking.”122
The company claimed that the Tobacco Act violated a trade
agreement between Australia and Hong Kong.
The suit resulted in international public criticism and
dissent from the ISDS mechanism in FTAs.123 Robert French,
Chief Justice of Australia’s Highest Court, subsequently gave a
speech reflecting the public dissatisfaction of ISDS proceedings
by highlighting the significance of the Philip Morris dispute and
the risks posed by ISDS.124 The recent approval of ChAFTA on
June 17, 2015, even though ISDS proceedings are included in
agreement, can provide an indication of ISDS changes and
whether more protection for a host state’s regulatory autonomy
exists.
In Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Philip Morris, a
United States company that holds a Hong Kong-based
subsidiary, claimed that the Tobacco Act violated provisions in
the Australia-Hong Kong BIT.125 Philip Morris alleged that the
Tobacco Act violated the commitment to “fair and equitable
TRADE AND INV. COMM’N, https://www.austrade.gov.au/Australian/Export/FreeTrade-Agreements/chafta (last visited Oct. 1, 2016).
120. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Notice of Claim, ¶ 10, (ITA Inv.
Treaty Cases 2011), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0664.pdf [hereinafter Philip Morris Claim].
121. See JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.).
122. Id.
123. See e.g., Danielle Mackey, The US-EU Trade Treaty That Could Let
Corporations Sue Governments, ALJAZEERA AM. (May 27, 2015),
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/5/27/a-eu-us-trade-agreement-couldallow.html (“[T]he Philip Morris case exemplifies some of the driving factors for
the public outcry over the system . . . .”).
124. Chief Justice Robert French, Investor-State Dispute Settlement—A
Cut Above the Courts?, Speech at the Supreme and Federal Courts Judges’
Conference 4–6 (July 9, 2014), http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications
/speeches/current-justices/frenchcj/frenchcj09jul14.pdf.
125. See Philip Morris Claim, supra note 120, ¶ 10 (b).
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treatment” of the company’s investments under Article 2(2).126
In addition, the company argued that the Tobacco Act
constituted a direct and indirect expropriation of investments
without adequate compensation, thereby violating Article 6 of
the Hong Kong-Australia BIT.127 The following text illustrates
the language governing expropriation in Article 6:
Investors of either Contracting Party shall not be
deprived of their investments nor subjected to measures
having effect equivalent to such deprivation in the area
of the other Contracting Party except under due process
of law, for a public purpose related to the internal needs
of that Party, on a non-discriminatory basis, and against
compensation.128
The Government of Australia responded by arguing that the
plain packaging measures are non-discriminatory regulatory
measures to achieve a public welfare objective: the protection of
public health.129 The government asserted that such measures
do not amount to expropriation and a duty of compensation.130
Furthermore, the government argued that the measure did not
constitute unfair or inequitable treatment because the measure
was not arbitrary.131 Rather, the Tobacco Act was based on a
“broad range of studies and reports on which the Australian
Government has relied in good faith, and is supported by leading
Australian and international public health experts” and was
“adopted following a transparent process.”132 Essentially, the
government alleges to have responded in good faith with a
“reasonable regulatory response” to address public health
concerns.133 After a lengthy process, the tribunal eventually
dismissed the suit, ruling in favor of the Government of
Australia. However, Australians incurred more than fifty
126. Id.
127. Id. ¶ 10 (a).
128. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.H.K., Sept. 15, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/Treaty
File/152.
129. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Australia, Case No. 2012-12, Australia’s
Response to the Notice of Arbitration, ¶ 38 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2011),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0666.pdf.
130. Id. ¶ 46.
131. Id. ¶ 47.
132. Id. ¶ 49.
133. See id.
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million dollars of taxpayers’ money arising from legal costs to
defend against the complaint.134
While increased public criticism against ISDS clauses
resulted from the Philip Morris suit, Australia signed a bilateral
trade agreement with China.135 The agreement makes several
changes in ISDS proceedings and attempts to further protect a
host state country’s right to regulate for legitimate public
welfare objectives. First, the preamble of the agreement notes
the recognition of safeguarding public welfare. “Upholding the
rights of their governments to regulate in order to meet national
policy objectives, and to preserve their flexibility to safeguard
public welfare.”136
Secondly, under Article 9.11, the text includes a public
welfare objective provision: “Measures of a Party that are nondiscriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives of
public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public
order shall not be the subject of a claim under this Section.”137
Furthermore, under Article 9.17, the agreement makes
certain changes to ISDS settlement proceedings by increasing
transparency throughout the arbitration process and
proceedings.138 Lastly, Article 9.8 further addresses regulatory
autonomy for a host state. The Article ensures that both states
are entitled to enact measures if it is:
(a) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health; (b) necessary to ensure compliance with laws and
regulations that are not inconsistent with this
Agreement; (c) imposed for the protection of national
treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value; or
(d) relating to the conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.139

134. Lori Wallach, Public Interest Takes a Hit Even When Phillip Morris’
Investor-State Attack on Australia Is Dismissed, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 5,
2016, 2:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/public-interesttakes-a-h_b_8918010.html.
135. See Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-China, June 17, 2015,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/chafta/official-documents/Pages/officialdocuments.aspx.
136. Id. at pmbl.
137. Id. art. 9.11(4).
138. See id. art. 9.17.
139. Id. art. 9.8(1).
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Thus, the increase in public criticism arising from the Philip
Morris suit has resulted in certain adjustments in Australia’s
trade policy that correspond to greater transparency of
arbitration proceedings and further protection of host-state
sovereignty.
D. AUSTRALIA, BRUNEI, CANADA, CHILE, JAPAN, MALAYSIA,
MEXICO, NEW ZEALAND, PERU, SINGAPORE, U.S.,
VIETNAM: PUBLIC SCRUTINY CONCERNING ISDS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS ON THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
(TPP)
On February 4, 2016, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, one of
the world’s largest multinational trade deals, was signed by
twelve member nations in New Zealand.140 The agreement is not
currently in force, though the signing represents “an important
step” toward implementation.141 Throughout the negotiation
process in the United States and other member nations the
prospective deal has received increased scrutiny among citizens
and policymakers. After intense scrutiny concerning a lack of
transparency, the text was publicly released on November 5,
2015.142 As a result of the recent signing, Congressional approval
is subsequently required for the agreement to enter into force in
the United States.143 During a Senate floor debate, Senator
Elizabeth Warren expressed her concerns on the signing of the
agreement in the following statement:
I urge my colleagues to reject the T.P.P. and stop an
agreement that would tilt the playing field even more in
favor of big multinational corporations and against
working families . . . . Evidence of this tilt can be seen in
140. See Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed, but
Years of Negotiations Still to Come, REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-idUSKCN0VD08S.
141. See id.
142. TPP Debate Ramps Up Following Public Release of Trade Deal Text,
INT’L CTR FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/tpp-debate-ramps-upfollowing-public-release-of-trade-deal-text; see also Lori Wallach, Polls Show
Americans Oppose Our Trade Policy but Like Trade, WORLD POST (Mar. 11,
2015 10:26 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lori-wallach/polls-showamericans-oppo_b_6847006.html.
143. See Jackie Calmes, Trans-Pacific Partnership Is Reached, but Faces
Scrutiny in Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/10/06/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-deal-is-reached.html?_r=0.
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a key T.P.P. provision, investor state dispute resolution,
ISDS. With ISDS, big companies get the right to
challenge laws they don’t like—not in courts but if [sic]
front of industry friendly arbitration panels that sit
outside any court system. Those panels can force
taxpayers to write huge checks to big corporations with
no appeals.144

As illustrated, Senator Warren specifically criticized ISDS
and its potential adverse implications on a host state’s taxpayers
when claims are initiated in “industry-friendly” arbitration
panels.145 With many other stakeholders sharing Senator
Warren’s consistent concerns on the TPP, negotiations have not
completely rejected these considerations. Criticism concerning
ISDS remained throughout the negotiating process. Even
though ISDS is still incorporated in the negotiated agreement,
the agreement includes some changes regarding its
application.146
First, with respect to regulatory autonomy and host-state
sovereignty, the agreement provides each country the ability to
regulate in the public interest. Under most contemporary trade
agreements, investors are protected against expropriation. In
the TPP, an expropriation is present when a Party “interferes
with a tangible or intangible property right or property interest
in an investment.”147 A direct expropriation occurs when an
investment is nationalized or “otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.”148 An
indirect expropriation occurs when “an action or series of actions
by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.”149 The
144. Statement of Sen. Warren, Senate Session Part 2, C-SPAN (Feb. 2,
2016), www.c-span.org/video/?c4579801/tpp.
145. See id.
146. See generally Peter K. Yu, TPP Trade Pact Still Needs Improvements to
Protect Governments From Foreign Suits, ECONOTIMES, Feb. 15, 2016,
http://www.econotimes.com/TPP-trade-pact-still-needs-improvements-toprotect-governments-from-foreign-suits-160947 (“To respond to these
criticisms, the TPP has built some new substantive and procedural safeguards
into its investment and related chapters.”).
147. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 9–Investment, MEDIUM BLOG
OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Annex 9-B(1) (Nov 5, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/investmentc76dbd892f3a#.fbk9tznp4 [hereinafter TPP Ch. 9].
148. Id. at Annex 9-B(2).
149. Id. at Annex 9-B(3).
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determination of an indirect expropriation requires a case-bycase inquiry considering several factors.150 However, the text
does provide protection for a host-state country’s public policy
objectives. The agreement reserves the right for each country to
regulate in the public interest. In particular, the following
language in the agreement counteracts complete investor
protection and the application of indirect expropriation: “[n]ondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed
and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such
as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriations, except in rare circumstances.”151
As shown in the above language, like CETA, the provision
does not classify a host-state government’s public welfare
policies as an “indirect expropriation” except in “rare
circumstances.”152 Thus, the language creates a presumption of
legitimacy, in favor of host-state government’s policies and
regulations.
There are additional safeguards incorporated in the
agreement concerning ISDS. In the Chapter Summary on
Investment, the United States Trade Representative states that
the chapter ensures American investors protection, “while
reforming the investor-state dispute settlement [ ] system by
providing for tools to dismiss frivolous claims and instituting a
range of other procedural and substantive safeguards.”153 In
particular, some procedural safeguards include prevention of an
investor pursuing the same claim in parallel proceedings,
amicus curiae submissions, and dismissal of frivolous claims.154
Furthermore, under arbitration proceedings, the agreement also
imposes investors the “burden of proving all elements of its
claims.”155 Under the Chapter on Dispute Settlement, the
agreement provides some improvements on the ISDS
mechanism. Unlike the United States Model BIT, a binding code
of conduct for arbitrators does exist. In the Model BIT, there is
no explicit provision where an arbitrator is required to disclose

150. Id. at Annex 9-B(3)(a)(i–iii).
151. Id. at Annex 9-B(3)(b).
152. See id.; see also Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), supra note 87.
153. TPP Ch. 9, supra note 147, at Chapter Summary.
154. See id.
155. Id. art. 9.23.
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any conflict of interest. In contrast, TPP countries will establish
a code of conduct for all panelists of a proceeding.156
Regarding transparency, the agreement contains a specific
chapter on “Transparency & Anti-Corruption.”157 According to
the United States Trade Representative, the chapter requires
TPP parties to ensure that “their laws, regulations, and
administrative rulings related to any matters covered by the
TPP Agreement are publicly available and that regulations are
subject to notice and comment.”158 The public in each TPP
country will thus be able to follow proceedings.159 Thus, even
though the TPP does not contain a specific appeals mechanism
for arbitration proceedings as advocated by Senator Warren and
others, the agreement signals an improvement on transparency
to further safeguard against ISDS abuses.
Lastly, as illustrated in Philip Morris, the Australian plain
packaging law had previously inspired criticism against the TPP
for possibly allowing the deal to embed greater protection for the
tobacco industry. Since 2013, many argued that the TPP would
continue to provide a favorable position for the tobacco industry
against host-countries and respective plain packaging laws.160
Nevertheless, the growing criticism and public backlash have
resulted in a loss for tobacco companies when the final TPP
agreement contained language disallowing ISDS protection to
156. Compare The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 28–Dispute
Settlement, MEDIUM BLOG OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov 5, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/dispute-settlementa5b4569a9a55#.sy0i2fakn [hereinafter TPP Ch. 28], with 2012 U.S. Model
Bilateral Investment Treaty, BILATERALS (2012), http://www.bilaterals.org
/IMG/pdf/BIT_text_for_ACIEP_Meeting.pdf.
157. See The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 26–Transparency & AntiCorruption, MEDIUM BLOG OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Nov 5, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/transparency-and-anticorruption-3d808cf86184#.gtn27zv3b [hereinafter TPP Ch. 26].
158. Id.
159. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Summary
of the Trans-Pac. P’ship Agreement, at ¶ 28, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacificpartnership (“The public in each TPP Party will be able to follow proceedings,
since submissions made in disputes will be made available to the public,
hearings will be open to the public unless the disputing Parties otherwise agree,
and the final report presented by panels will also be made available to the
public.”).
160. See generally Jane Kelsey, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A
Gold-Plated Gift to the Global Tobacco Industry?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 237–64
(2013) (explaining that some of proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
rules, if accepted, could bring about favorable change to the U.S. tobacco
industry by removing tariff barriers and regulatory restrictions).
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apply to tobacco industries.161 In particular, under Article 29.5
of the agreement, a host-state government can elect to deny the
ability of a tobacco company to challenge a government’s
“tobacco control measure.”162 The text explicitly states:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of
Chapter 9 (Investment) with respect to claims
challenging a tobacco control measure of the Party
. . . .For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny
benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall
be dismissed.163
In the Chapter Summary, the United States Trade
Representative explained that the provision reflects “the ability
to regulate manufactured tobacco products and protect public
health.”164 For the first time in any trade agreement, each TPP
country is given the right to decide whether investors under
ISDS can challenge its tobacco control measures.165 In effect,
prior criticism on the tobacco industry and the Australian plain
packaging law dispute has resulted in considerable changes in
the TPP to safeguard against ISDS abuse from tobacco
companies.
In sum, although Senator Warren’s criticism has not
resulted in a complete abandonment of the ISDS mechanism or
establishment of an appeals court, the TPP presents some
improvements. Keep in mind, the TPP is a large multilateral
agreement consisting of major countries including the United
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. Specifically, the
agreement includes economies that represent nearly forty
percent of global GDP.166 Although the agreement is not
161. See Willa Frej, It’s Been a Bad Year for Big Tobacco, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 18, 2015, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/big-tobaccolosses_us_5673f7e0e4b06fa6887cebe2.
162. The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Chapter 29–Exceptions, MEDIUM BLOG
OFFICE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, art. 29.5 (Nov 5, 2015),
https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/exceptions1299fbf34b76#.mts1mnpxt.
163. Id.
164. See id. at Chapter Summary.
165. See id. (“[T]PP, for the first time in any trade agreement, builds on
structures established in the agreement to give each Party the right to decide
that its tobacco control measures for manufactured tobacco products cannot be
challenged by private investors under Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS).”).
166. Press Release, supra note 159.
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currently in force and prospects of implementation remain
uncertain, it provides an illustration of how major countries are
reassessing and rethinking their approach to ISDS. As a result,
while the ISDS mechanism remains as a protection for investors
in the TPP, substantive and procedural changes illustrate a shift
to further safeguard against abuses and protect host-state
sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION: TRADE POLICY AMONG COUNTRIES
ARE SHIFTING TOWARDS SAFEGUARDING
AGAINST ISDS ABUSES AND PROTECTING
HOST-STATE SOVEREIGNTY
As the number of ISDS claims has increased throughout the
years, public criticism has been shared internationally in light
of investors filing suits against host nations. In particular,
investor suits challenging a host nation’s ability to adopt public
policy have largely received public scrutiny. In a more
interconnected and open global marketplace, liberalizing rules
to attract more trade and investment can impact a host-state’s
ability to effectuate policy objectives concerning public health,
safety, and the environment.
In response to growing public dissent concerning ISDS
proceedings and the exposure of suits compromising domestic
policy, many countries have reassessed their policies in
international trade treaties. As recent global trade policies and
agreements suggest, changes to ISDS signal an emerging shift
towards further safeguards against ISDS abuses and greater
protections for host state sovereignty. India’s new Model BIT,
CAFTA, ChAFTA, and the TPP reflect a change to reform the
ISDS mechanism and incorporate more substantive provisions
that further protect a host state’s regulatory autonomy. Moving
forward, as countries rethink trade policy and enter into
prospective trade agreements, substantive changes can provide
further insight on the rules governing trade in the 21st century.

